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Technical means for identifying when tampering occurs is a critical part of many containment and
surveillance technologies. Conventional fiber optic seals provide methods for monitoring enclosed
inventories, but they are vulnerable to spoofing attacks based on classical physics. We address
these vulnerabilities with the development of a quantum seal that offers the ability to detect the
intercept-resend attack using quantum integrity verification. Our approach represents an application
of entanglement to provide guarantees in the authenticity of the seal state by verifying it was
transmitted coherently. We implement these ideas using polarization-entangled photon pairs that
are verified after passing through a fiber-optic channel testbed. Using binary detection theory, we
find the probability of detecting inauthentic signals is greater than 0.9999 with a false alarm chance
of 10−9 for a 10 second sampling interval. In addition, we show how the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect
concurrently provides a tight bound on redirection attack, in which tampering modifies the shape of
the seal. Our measurements limit the tolerable path length change to sub-millimeter disturbances.
These tamper-indicating features of the quantum seal offer unprecedented security for unattended
monitoring systems.
PACS numbers: 42.50.Ar,03.67.Bg,42.79.Sz
I. INTRODUCTION
Tamper-indicating optical seals are widely used for ver-
ifying the integrity of enclosed systems, including stor-
age containers, physical perimeters, and fiber networks
[1–4]. Fiber-optic seals have proven especially useful for
actively surveying large areas or inventories due to the
extended transmission range and flexible layout of fiber
[5, 6]. These seals operate as optical continuity sensors
that confirm transmission of an encoded light pulse from
source to receiver with tampering indicated by either the
absence of the light or an error in the received encoding.
In the classical setting, detection of tampering requires
failure of the intruder to accurately replicate the original
transmission. This is typically accomplished with “se-
cret” information that is hidden from the intruder, for
example, the optical modulation sequence used to trans-
mit pulses. This secret information, however, is vulner-
able to discovery by the intruder using conventional sig-
nal detection methods. Thus, in principle, an attacker is
able to perfectly replicate the optical signal using a priori
knowledge, and the classical variant of an optical seal is
vulnerable to an intercept-resend spoofing attack. In this
case, the intruder has the ability to recover information,
such as the frequency, bandwidth, and modulation, that
describes the classical state of the light. An exact dupli-
cate of the transmitted signal can then be replicated by
the attacker and injected into the fiber, thus spoofing the
downstream sensor.
By contrast, cloning quantum information is prohib-
ited by the linearity of quantum mechanics [7, 8]. At-
tempts to clone quantum information, even optimally,
necessarily introduce noise into the resulting state and
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its subsequent observables [9]. These guarantees of the
no-cloning theorem are well known from quantum key
distribution (QKD), where non-local correlations inher-
ent to quantum states are used to secure correlated mea-
surements outcomes between users [10]. A QKD eaves-
dropper’s attempt to clone transmitted quantum states
introduces additional noise into the observed results that
reveal her presence to the users [11–13]. In the context
of QKD, added noise manifests as larger bit-error rates
in the raw measurements and theoretical considerations
have set upper limits on the security of these systems.
We report how the no-cloning theorem can be applied
to the development of tamper-indicating seals. In partic-
ular, we close the intercept-resent vulnerability for opti-
cal seals by using entangled quantum states to monitor
signal continuity, and we demonstrate how the intercept-
resent attack can be detected by monitoring the entan-
glement between a pair of transmitted photons. Because
FIG. 1. A schematic of a tamper-indicating quantum optical
seal showing four major components: (a) an entangled pho-
ton source, (b) reference and active fiber optic links, (c) an
entanglement verification measurement, and (d) a monitoring
system that process timestamped single photon detections.
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2entanglement between the photon pair can only be gen-
erated at the authenticated transmitter, any attempt to
spoof the receiver with a replicated photon is immedi-
ately detected. We formalize detection of tampering in
terms of a statistical estimate of the entanglement and
show how entanglement distinguishes between an authen-
tic seal state and a potential tampered seal. We im-
plement these ideas using spectrally and polarization-
entangled photon pairs as part of a quantum signal detec-
tion system. Our results find a probability of detection
for inauthentic signals greater than 0.99999 at a false
alarm rate of one in a billion for a 10 second sampling
interval.
We also present tight bounds on an intruder’s ability to
spoof the seal using a second type of attack based on redi-
rection of the signal path. The latter vulnerability arises
when the intruder changes the path length of the opti-
cal signal, perhaps when rerouting around the intended
enclosure. Conventional approaches to detect this at-
tack rely on anomalies in the signal time-of-arrival, which
is limited by the timestamping electronics. We employ
the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect between energy-degenerate
entangled photons to detect submillimeter path length
changes. Finally, we present a prototype implementa-
tion and experimental results that validate detection of
these various tampering methods with estimations of the
transmitted entanglement.
Entanglement has been proposed previously to offer an
advantage for various forms of tamper detection. This
includes our earlier efforts to demonstrate intrusion de-
tection by monitoring the free-space optical transmis-
sion of entangled states as a kind of a quantum tripwire
[14]. Those experiments used a sensing configuration in
which the polarization entanglement between two pho-
tons transmitted to different measurement receivers was
quantified. This system was subsequently improved with
the development of non-local polarization interferome-
try, which offers greater sensitivity to the transmitted
state while providing more efficient sampling [15]. Sim-
ilar research for perimeter monitoring has applied the
idea of interaction-free measurement to create an invis-
ible quantum fence, in which the intruder is unable to
detect the quantum signal state with very high proba-
bility [16]. There have also been previous uses of en-
tanglement verification applied to remote sensing, where
the quantum statistics of a reflected signal are used to
authenticate the results of an imaging system [17].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
present our model for the quantum seal, and we for-
malize the problem of tamper detection using binary de-
tection theory. In Sec. III, we detail the experimental
implementation of the seal including the entangled pho-
ton pair source, entanglement detection, and Hong-Ou-
Mandel interference measurements. Additionally, the re-
sults of our experimental studies to characterize seal per-
formance in term of observed entanglement statistics and
acquisition times are given in this section. We conclude
our presentation in Sec. IV.
FIG. 2. A Bell-state analyzer (BSA) consists of two modes
labeled as 0 and 1 input to a symmetric beamsplitter, whose
output modes 2 and 3 direct to a pair of polarization ana-
lyzers and single-photon detectors. A beamsplitter after the
polarization analyzer allow probabilistic detection of each co-
incidence type.
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
A schematic diagram of a quantum seal prototype is
presented in Fig.1. It consists of a secure enclave that
generates and detects a quantum signal state and an
unsecure area that corresponds with the system to be
monitored. The quantum signal state is a pair of pho-
tons prepared in a polarization-entangled Bell state by
cw-pumping of type-II spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC). These photons are coupled into ac-
tive and reference fibers, where the active fiber traverses
the unsecure area and the reference fiber remains inside
the secure enclave.
The footprint of the active fiber is configured to mon-
itor access to an enclosure, for example, the inventory
of closed containers shown in Fig. 1. The reference fiber
is co-located with the transmitter and effectively repre-
sents a photon storage loop. Both fibers terminate at
a Faraday mirror that reflects the photons and corrects
for any polarization scrambling prior to the return tip.
After reflection, each photon is router by a circulators to
one of the input ports of the Bell-state analyzer (BSA)
shown in Fig. 2. The photons are subsequently detected
and the resulting information output port and polariza-
tion enables partial discrimination of the Bell states and
entanglement detection.
A. Entanglement Detection
The Bell-state analyzer (BSA) shown in Fig. 2 supports
partial discrimination between the polarization-encoded
Bell states [18, 19],∣∣Ψ±〉 = (|H0V1〉 ± |V0H1〉)/√2∣∣Φ±〉 = (|H0H1〉 ± |V0V1〉)/√2.
3where Hi and Vi label horizontally and vertically polar-
ized photons in spatial mode i. The states Ψ+ and Ψ−
have distinct detection signatures that allow determin-
istic identification, whereas the Φ± states are not dis-
tinguishable amongst themselves but are distinguishable
from Ψ± 1 Moreover, consider an arbitrary two-photon
pure state
|θ〉 = (a |H0, H1〉+ b |H0, V1〉+ c |V0, H1〉+ d |V0, V1〉
= (ahˆ†0hˆ
†
1 + bhˆ
†
0vˆ
†
1 + cvˆ
†
0hˆ
†
1 + dvˆ
†
0vˆ
†
1) |0〉 (1)
where the photons are temporally indistinguishable, op-
erator qˆ†i rˆ
†
s creates q, r ∈ {h, v} polarization photons in
spatial modes i, s ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, (1 + δqrδis)-1/2qˆ†i rˆ†s |0〉 =
|QiRs〉, and [qˆi, rˆ†s] = δqrδis holds. We calculate the ex-
pected detection signature for this state in the BSA by
defining the operator transforms under the symmetric
beamsplitter as [20, 23]
hˆ†0
BS→
(
hˆ†2 + ihˆ
†
3
)
/
√
2 hˆ†1
BS→
(
ihˆ†2 + hˆ
†
3
)
/
√
2 (2)
vˆ†0
BS→
(
vˆ†2 − ivˆ†3
)
/
√
2 vˆ†1
BS→
(
−ivˆ†2 + vˆ†3
)
/
√
2 (3)
where h†0 is the creation operator for |H0〉, etc. The cor-
responding post-beamsplitter state is
|θ′〉= (1/2)[ia(hˆ†22 + hˆ†23 )− id(vˆ†22 + vˆ†23 ) + i(b− c)hˆ†2vˆ†2
− i(b− c)hˆ†3vˆ†3 + (b+ c)hˆ†2vˆ†3 + (b+ c)vˆ†2hˆ†3] |0〉 (4)
and the complete set of detection probabilities
Ph2h2 = Ph3h3 = |a|2/2 (5)
Pv2v2 = Pv3v3 = |d|2/2 (6)
Ph2v3 = Ph3v2 =
[|b|2 + |c|2 + (b∗c+ bc∗)] /4 (7)
Ph2v2 = Ph3v3 =
[|b|2 + |c|2 − (b∗c+ bc∗)] /4. (8)
As required, the sum over all probabilities is unity. Coin-
cidence probabilities involving different polarizations are
related to the overlap of the input state in Eq. (1) with
Ψ±, i.e.,
Ph2v3 + Ph3v2 = |
〈
θ|Ψ+〉 |2 (9)
Ph2v2 + Ph3v3 = |
〈
θ|Ψ−〉 |2. (10)
We use the observed BSA detection statistics to dis-
tinguish the Bell-state prepared by the secure enclave
from any other possible signal state. We define the
polarization-correlation parameter
E ≡ Ph2v3 + Ph3v2 − Ph2v2 − Ph3v3 (11)
1 A complete BSA is possible using linear optics and hyperentan-
glement [20–22].
which is positive (negative) when orthogonal polariza-
tions at different (same) ports is most probable. For the
monochromatic pure state of Eq. (1)
E = b∗c+ bc∗. (12)
The utility of E is that it places tight lower bounds on the
strength of the correlations expected from the received
states. For example, consider the separable state
|θs〉=(cosαhˆ†0 + eiA sinαvˆ†0)(cosβhˆ†1 + eiB sinβvˆ†1) |0〉
(13)
for which
a = cosα cosβ b = eiB cosα sinβ (14)
c = eiA sinα cosβ d = ei(A+B) sinα sinβ, (15)
in Eq. (1) with phases α, β,A,B ∈ [0, 2pi]. This restricted
state leads to the correlation parameter
Es = sin 2α sin 2β cos(A−B)/2 (16)
that is strictly bounded as
− 1/2 ≤ Es ≤ 1/2. (17)
More generally, any separable mixture
ρs =
∑
k
wk
∣∣θks 〉 〈θks ∣∣ ,
with wk ≥ 0 and |θk〉 the k-th pure state also satisfies
this bound, since∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
wkEks
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
k
wk/2 = 1/2. (18)
By comparison, the entangled states Ψ+ and Ψ− have
E = 1 and E = −1, respectively, while the cross-
correlation parameter vanishes for the Φ(±) states. Thus,
E > 1/2 indicates an entangled state, but E is not an
entanglement metric. The sharp distinction in the pa-
rameter E permits us to classify an arbitrary input state
as either Ψ-like entangled or not.
The analysis above neglects the finite temporal du-
ration of each single-photon wavepacket in favor of a
simplified monochromatic representation of the polarized
states. In order to accurately model the time-of-arrival
for each photon, we represent the Bell-state generated by
the source as a multi-mode entangled photon pair∣∣Ψ+〉= 1√
2
∫
dω
∫
dω′f(ω, ω′)
×
[
hˆ†0(ω)vˆ
†
1(ω
′) + vˆ†0(ω)hˆ
†
1(ω
′)
]
|0〉 . (19)
where f(ω, ω′) is the joint spectral amplitude of the pho-
ton pair and jˆ†i (ω) creates a single j ∈ {h, v} polarization
photon in spatial mode i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} with frequency ω.
4For these continuous operators the commutation relation
is
[jˆi(ω),ˆ`
†
s(ω
′)] = δj`δisδ(ω − ω′) (20)
The symmetric beam splitter relations are the same as in
the single frequency case, Eq. (2) and (3), and instead of
the state given in Eq. (4), we have the post-beamsplitter
state
|θΨ+〉 = 1
2
√
2
∫
dω
∫
dω′f(ω, ω′)eiω
′td×(
−i[hˆ†2(ω)vˆ†2(ω′)− vˆ†2(ω)hˆ†2(ω′)]
− i[vˆ†3(ω)hˆ†3(ω′)− hˆ†3(ω)vˆ†3(ω′)]
+ [hˆ†2(ω)vˆ
†
3(ω
′) + hˆ†2(ω
′)vˆ†3(ω)]
+[vˆ†2(ω
′)hˆ†3(ω) + vˆ
†
2(ω)hˆ
†
3(ω
′)]
)
|0〉
where td is the potential delay between the reference and
active photon arrival times. This delay arises when the
path length of active photon is shortened (td < 0) or
lengthened (td > 0). The multi-mode detection proba-
bilities are now given as
Pji`s =
∫
T
dτ | 〈0| jˆi(t)ˆ`s(t+ τ)|Ψ+′〉|2 (21)
where
ˆji(t) =
1√
2pi
∫
dωjˆi(ω)e
−iωt. (22)
The joint spectral amplitude for a cw-pumped type-II
SPDC source is modeled as
f(ω, ω′) = δ(ω + ω′ − ωp)sinc (∆kL/2) (23)
where the longitudinal wave vector mismatch ∆k de-
pends on the group velocity for the ordinary and extraor-
dinary optical axes [24, 25]. In this regime, the detection
probabilities become
Ph2v2 = Ph3v3 =
1
4
[1−∧ (2td/∆t)] (24)
Ph2v3 = Pv2h3 =
1
4
[1 +∧ (2td/∆t)] (25)
where ∆t is the propagation delay between ordinary and
extraordinary photons travelling the full length of the
nonlinear crystal [24].
∧ (x) =
{
1− |x| if |x| ≤ 1
0 otherwise.
(26)
These results converge to the monochromatic case when
the delay td = 0, whereas if tampering delays the photon
in the active fiber, but preserves the polarization entan-
glement, then the delay adds temporal distinguishability
to the photons. For the multi-mode case with maximal
FIG. 3. A contour plot of the entanglement parameter E
presented in Eq. (28) with respect to the pure state coefficients
bc∗+b∗c and time delay td. The parameter E has extremal
values when the input state is maximally polarized and there
is no relative delay between the photons.
polarization entanglement and temporal distinguishabil-
ity, the cross-correlation parameter behaves as
Epe =∧ (2td/∆t) . (27)
Therefore, delays greater than a fraction of ∆t are de-
tected even if the polarization entanglement is preserved.
For our optical implementation, ∆t ≈ 8 picoseconds and
a one-way path length difference greater than 300 mi-
crons results in |E| ≤ 1/2. As one might expect, it can
be shown that an arbitrary polarization multi-mode pure
state has a correlation dependent on both the degree of
polarization entanglement and temporal distinguishabil-
ity,
Emm =∧(2td/∆t)(bc∗ + b∗c). (28)
For td/∆t << 1, we recover the monochromatic result
presented in Eq. (12). The entanglement dependency re-
moves the possibility that the state may be spoofed, while
the temporal sensitivity limits the adversary’s ability to
attack by redirection. In Fig. 3, the temporal and phase
space of the parameter E is represented graphically.
B. Entanglement Parameter Estimation
We detect entanglement by estimating E from the cor-
related polarizations measured by the BSA. Due to the
symmetry of the BSA, the coincident probabilities in
5Eqs. (5)-(8) satisfy
Ph2h3 =Pv2v3 = psd/2 (29)
Ph2h2 =Ph3h3 = Pv2v2 = Pv3v3 = pss/4 (30)
Ph2v2 =Ph3v3 = pds/2 (31)
Ph2v3 =Pv2h3 = pdd/2 (32)
where subscripts s and d denote detections as being same
or different, respectively, in the polarization and output
mode. We estimate E from these four parameters.
We estimate the set of coincident probabilities P =
{psd, pss, pds, pdd} from the experimentally observed co-
incidence counts cij∀i, j ∈ {s, d}. However, the relative
frequency of these measured rates do not directly corre-
spond to the probabilities due to several technical limits.
First, the SPDC source described in Sec. III is known to
result in registering accidental coincidences between pho-
tons from different entangled pairs and to a lesser degree
photon-dark count coincidences. These so-called “acci-
dentals” are rare but add a contribution cacc to the ob-
served coincidences. Second, the efficiencies for each joint
two-photon pathway are typically different. Our first
correction removes contributions from accidental coinci-
dences and eliminates joint efficiency asymmetries with
the formula
c′i =
ηmin
ηi
(ci − cacc) (33)
where i∈{h2h3, v2v3, h2h2, v2v2, h2v2, h3v3, h2v3, v2h3},
ci is the raw coincidence count, ηi ∈ [0, 1] is the joint
pathway efficiency for coincidence i, and ηmin is the least
of these joint pathway efficiencies. Since ηmin/ηi ≤ 1,
normalization typically increases the uncertainty in the
entanglement estimate. We sum all coincidences that
belong to the same coincidence type, ss, sd, ds, or dd,
ksd = c
′
h2h3 + c
′
v2v3 (34)
kss = c
′
h2h2 + c
′
v2v2 (35)
kds = c
′
h2v2 + c
′
h3v3 (36)
kdd = c
′
h2v3 + c
′
h3v2 , (37)
to obtain coincidence type totals κ={ksd, kss, kds, kdd}.
The last technicality is that our experimental proto-
type monitors statistics in only one arm of the BSA,
which reduces the number of observed same-port same-
polarization coincidences by a factor of a half relative to
the expected value. Comparing Eq. (30) and (35), we
see that monitoring only one port for same-port same-
polarization coincidences results in the absence of cor-
rected counts ch3h3 and cv3v3 from Eq. (35). Addi-
tionally, we use non-photon number resolving detectors,
which reduces the recorded number of events by an ad-
ditional factor of one half for these same-port same-
polarization events. The joint efficiencies given above are
determined relative to the actual number of photons in
a given pathway. Thus, the joint efficiencies given above
do not account for the losses relevant to same-port same
polarization coincidence events. In principle, we could
determine joint efficiencies that would account for these
events, but it would greatly increase the uncertainty in
our parameter. Instead, we maximize the certainty of our
parameter estimation by including these known losses di-
rectly into the model. This is done by averaging over all
possible values of the true number of same-port, same-
polarization events nss. The resulting probability distri-
bution for P given normalized coincidence type totals κ
is
P (P|κ) = p
ksd
sd p
kds
ds p
kdd
dd
∑∞
nss=kss
(
nss
kss
) (
pss
4
)nss
P (κ)
(38)
P (κ) is the numerator integrated over all possible values
of coincident probabilities, psd, pss, pds, and pdd.
Given the set of normalized coincidences totals κ, we
estimate E as the mean
Eκ =
∫
P (P|κ)(pdd − pds)dP (39)
which yields
Eκ =
(kdd − kds)2F˜1(1+kss, 1+kss; 5+n; 14 )
2F˜1(1+kss, 1+kss; 4+n;
1
4 )
(40)
where n = ksd+kss+kds+kdd and 2F˜1(a; b; c) is the reg-
ularized hypergeometric function. We similarly calculate(E2)
κ
to derive the variance σ2κ =
(E2)
κ
− (Eκ)2 in the
estimate.
C. Tamper Detection
Under normal operation, the quantum seal transmits
polarization-entangled states through the active and ref-
erence fibers and the BSA measurements yield an esti-
mate for the entanglement parameter E . When the esti-
mate Eκ exceeds the bound of 1/2, then the seal confirms
that the received photon pairs are entangled. This use
of quantum integrity verification certifies that the seal
is unmolested. Moreover, the presence of entanglement
is doubly indicative, as it confirms that the photon in-
jected into the active fiber is both the same photon re-
trieved from the active fiber and that the path length
difference between the reference and active fiber links is
much smaller than the single-photon coherence length.
By contrast, quantum integrity verification fails when
the estimate Eκ lies below the threshold value of 1/2.
This occurs in presence of tampering due to either a
temporal shift in the photon time-of-arrival or a loss of
entanglement between the photons from the intercept-
resend attack. However, verification may also fail because
of technical noise during transmission and measurement,
e.g., decoherence of the entangled state. Therefore it is
necessary to quantify the probability to accurately detect
tampering as well as the rate at which detection fails.
6We formalize the tamper detection problem as a bi-
nary decision in which the estimate of E decides between
two possible hypothesis [26]. Under the positive hypoth-
esis H1, tampering is indicated when the entanglement
estimate Ek is below a detection threshold defined as .
Under the null hypothesis H0, the transmitted entangle-
ment is preserved and the estimate exceeds the threshold
. We gain greater confidence in our decision by choos-
ing  > 1/2 but at the expense of a higher probability of
false alarm rate, i.e., classifying entangled states as being
inauthentic.
We characterize normal operation of the seal by an
average entanglement parameter E1 and its correspond-
ing variance σ2. The nominal value E1 characterizes the
amount of entanglement expected from the system in the
absence of tampering. This value also characterizes the
quality of the transmission and includes effects due to
environmental decoherence. We also define the expecta-
tion value in the presence of tampering as |E0| ≤ 1/2,
which follows from the known the theoretical limitations
of the entanglement parameter, and we will assume that
the variance is the same as under normal operation, σκ.
Given an estimate Eκ, our task is to decide whether tam-
pering has occurred,
H0 : Eκ = E0 + e ≤ , (41)
or not,
H1 : Eκ = E1 + e >  (42)
In both hypotheses, e represents a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with average variance σ2κ, while the de-
tection threshold  will depend on the implementation.
For example, the threshold value should be chosen to
limit the number of false alarms as well as to limit the
possibility of successful spoofing. The probability distri-
bution for Eκ under each hypothesis is closely approxi-
mated by the Gaussian
P (Eκ|Ei, σκ) ≈ 1√
2piσ2κ
exp
[
− (Eκ − Ei)
2
2σ2κ
]
(43)
where i ∈ {0, 1}.
The discrimination of two constant signals in the pres-
ence of Gaussian noise is a well known problem in binary
detection theory [26]. The probability to detect tamper-
ing is given as
PD =
1
2
erfc
(E0 − √
2σκ
)
. (44)
where
erfc(x) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
x
e−z
2
dz (45)
is the complimentary error function. The corresponding
probability for spoofing is
PS = 1− PD (46)
while the probability of a false alarm, in which an au-
thentic signal is misidentified as spoofed, is
PFAR =
1
2
erfc
(E1 − √
2σκ
)
(47)
The probability of detection and false alarm characterize
operation of the seal for a given threshold , and the
parametric dependence of PD and PFAR are presented
by the receiver operating characteristic curve in Fig. (4).
Therefore, operation of the seal can be tuned by selecting
a detection threshold  that provides a desired probability
of detection or false alarm rate.
FIG. 4. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
display a parametric plot of the probability of detection PD
versus the false alarm rate rate PFAR. Assuming that tam-
pering yields E0 = 1/2 with uncertainty σ = 0.1, we plot the
behavior for baseline entanglement values of E1 = 0.55, 0.7,
and 0.85. Our experimental prototype exhibits much smaller
uncertainty and higher baseline entanglement.
It is apparent from Fig. 4 that tampering can be de-
tected with very high probability when the normal op-
erating value E1 is close to the theoretical maximum of
±1. This is due to the sharp transition separating au-
thentic and spoofed signal as represented by the bounds
in Eq. (17), which may be violated by many orders of
standard deviation when transmitting the Ψ± entangled
state. Note that it is also possible that during the time
T required to estimate E that an intruder may inject an
unentangled state for some duration t < T . The presence
of the injected state would prepare a mixture of actual
and spoofed states with the entanglement estimated as
E(t, T ) = t
T
E0 + (T − t)
T
E1 (48)
Intrusions would be indicated when E(t, T ) < , i.e., for
t >
(E1 − )
(E1 − E0)T .
Since E0 may be at most 1/2 and E1 is a constant of
the system, the duration for this short-time spoofing de-
7creases linearly with the threshold . Moreover, the prob-
ability of detection increases nonlinearly with , as seen
in Eq. (45), and short-time attacks can be detected with
high probability at a relatively low false alarm rate using
only moderate increases in detection threshold. Short-
time attacks may also be mitigated by decreasing the
duration T used for estimating the entanglement.
While entanglement excludes spoofing the measure-
ment apparatus with a cloned state, a savvy adversary
may attempt to redirect the active photon away from
the tamper seal in order to access the surveyed area.
The estimated entanglement in this scenario will behave
normally when the optical path length of the redirected
photon is exactly matched. We address this vulnerabil-
ity in our implementation by making the entanglement
estimate sensitive to sub-millimeter disturbances in the
expected path length. Such tolerances can be adjusted
to fit application-specific requirements, for example, by
broadening the spectral bandwidth of the single-photon
states emitted from the source. Temporal shaping will
retain the spectral entanglement required for tamper de-
tection and converge on interferometric fringe stability in
the infinite bandwidth limit. This offers greater system
stability as well as increased sensitivity to the redirection
attack.
Depending on the length of the optical fiber used and
the location of deployment, variations in the ambient
temperature may alter the active and reference fiber path
lengths. Fibers exposed to different ambient conditions
may experience a change in path length ∆L (m) that is
proportional to the initial fiber length L0 (m) and tem-
perature change ∆T (◦C),
∆L =
αL0
m ·◦C∆T (49)
with thermal expansion coefficient α = 10−6 being a high
estimate [27]. Consider the example of L0=1 km for each
of the active and reference fibers and a temperature dif-
ferential ∆T=± 10◦C. This produces a round-trip path
length change of ∆L=± 20 mm. This change is large
enough to distinguish the active and reference photons
temporally while also small enough to be compensated
by simple adjustments to the reference path length. For
example, a free-space coupler mounted on a translatable
stage can be used to regulate the path length alongside
environmental monitoring.
The expected changes in path length due to time of
day and weather patterns are relatively slow and very
distinct from the sudden, unexpected changes in path
length that result from tampering. The quantum seal is
sensitive to effects on the time scale T , and this includes
sudden changes in environmental conditions such as pres-
sure on the fiber or a rapid rise in temperature. The seal
does not discriminate between intentional and uninten-
tional acts that modify decoherence in the transmission
channel. However, our theoretical account of stochastic
fluctuations on the estimate demonstrate that the prob-
ability of detection remains high even for moderate value
of σκ, cf. Eq. (44).
We also examine the attack in which an intruder re-
places the active link with an exact replica. This re-
placement attack may be technically challenging, but it
is nonetheless physically possible. Implementing the at-
tack would require first characterizing the active fiber
link, then severing the original transmission channel and
joining the replica fiber to both the transmitter and re-
ceiver, and finally coupling the photon into the replica
link. These steps are easily detectable as they modify
the physical properties of the fiber and break the con-
tinuity of transmission. Alternatively, the seal system
could be depowered so that optical continuity was bro-
ken at the source. A blackout event would again indicate
tampering and when power was returned to the system, a
system calibration procedure that included checking fiber
installation would reveal evidence of the replacement at-
tack.
III. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we detail the experimental implemen-
tation of the quantum seal modeled in Sec. II and Fig. 1.
A schematic of the experimental layout is shown in
Fig. 5, in which the entangled light source is based on
cw-pumping of type-II spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) in a nonlinear optical PPKTP (pe-
riodically polled potassium titanyl phosphate) crystal
within a Sagnac loop. This configuration generates a
polarization-entangled pair state Ψ+ [28]. The narrow-
band pump laser operates at 405 nm and a power of ap-
proximately 1 mW. At this power, the source generates
approximately 1.2 million photon pairs per second. The
nonlinear PPKTP crystal is 30 mm in length and phase-
matched to produce near-degenerate energy collinear
photon pairs with orthogonal polarizations. These pho-
tons have a central wavelength centered an 810 nm with
a 0.5 nm bandwidth.
The entangled light source transmits each photon
of the entangled pair to separate polarization phase-
maintaining circulators. For convenience, we use lossy,
but easily configured, symmetric beamsplitters as circu-
lators. As opposed to more elaborate setups, this reduces
the overall photon pair collection efficiency by 90% and
represents the dominant loss mechanism. Whereas this
setup is sufficient for our proof-of-principle demonstra-
tion, future tamper seals would benefit from using more
efficient dual polarization phase preserving optical circu-
lators. Following the circulators, one photon is output to
the active fiber, while the other is routed to the reference
fiber. We use 20-m single-mode fibers for both the active
and reference links with polarization controllers to cor-
rect for polarization rotation that occurs during the fiber
round-trip. Polarization entanglement would be reduced
or lost completely without this correction. We include
an optical delay stage at the terminal of the active fiber
in order to implement redirection attacks.
8Once the active and reference photons have completed
the round trip through the respective fibers, they are
routed to a Bell-state analyzer consisting of symmet-
ric beamsplitters, polarization beamsplitters, and single-
photon detectors. Our BSA is modeled after the design
shown in Fig. 2, but we do not monitor the full set of
possible coincidences. This is due to the symmetry ex-
pected for the detection probabilities given by Eqs. (5)-
(8). This comes at the expense of a reduced data set size
and correspondingly greater uncertainty in the param-
eter estimate, but reduces the number of single-photon
detectors needed. We use Perkin-Elmer (now Excelitas)
SPCM devices which have an efficiency of 0.4 at photon
wavelength 810 nm. Due to pathway efficiencies ranging
from 5 − 6 × 10−3 we observe single-photon counts per
second (cps) in the range of 2− 6× 103 cps and average
coincidence rates in the range of 0-15 cps.
We measure photon time-of-arrival by monitoring the
output signal from the detector array. Photon detection
triggers a detector to output a 25 ns TTL pulse that
is then timestamped and logged according to detector
identifier. We implement timestamping by sending the
TTL pulses to an FPGA (field programmable gate ar-
ray) configured with a custom daughter card that con-
nects up to eight coaxial cables to input pins. We have
reported previously on the use of FPGA’s for perform-
ing single-photon detection, in which we timestamp each
TTL pulse against the FPGA clock and store the result-
ing data alongside the input channel identifier [29]. In the
current implementation, we use a Zedboard system-on-
a-chip composed from an FPGA and ARM processor.2
We operate the FPGA using a 10 ns clock cycle for the
FIG. 5. The experimental schematic for our prototype
tamper-indicating quantum seal showing its four major com-
ponents: (a) a polarization-entangled photon source, (b) 20
meter single-mode fiber-optic channels for the reference and
active links, (c) polarization-entanglement verification based
on Bell-state analyzer, and (d) timestamping electronics inte-
grated with a processor to transmit observed coincidences to
a host computer for parameter estimation.
2 http://www.zedboard.org
detection system. Stored timestamp data is then aggre-
gated and packetized by custom software running on the
ARM processor within the Xillinux operating system.3
These packets are then transmitted over Ethernet using
the UDP protocol to a host computer where the entan-
glement parameter is estimated [30].
We experimentally detect tampering by estimating E
using the prototype quantum seal. The results are shown
in Fig. 6, where the dependence of Eκ is plotted against
tuning of the entanglement in the input state and the
relative difference between the active and reference paths.
These plots correspond to modifying the delay and phase
parameters of Eq. (28). Assuming the source generates
the Ψ+ Bell state, the entanglement parameter is
E =∧(2td/τc)Cos (φ+ pi) . (50)
which clearly depends on the optical delay td and the
relative phase φ. Settings of φ=0 and φ=pi correspond
to the Bell states Ψ− and Ψ+ , respectively. By adjust-
ing the phase φ, we tune the state that was returned to
the detector from being authentic to inauthentic. This
was accomplished experimentally by modulating, chang-
ing the applied voltage, a liquid crystal waveplate in the
active photon path as seen in Fig. 5. The temporal de-
lay td was adjusted by translating the reflection mirror
at the end of the active fiber.
The experimentally estimated entanglement parameter
is shown in Fig. 6, where a maximum value of |Eκ| ≈ 0.8
is obtained. This statistically significant estimate is well
above the separable bound of 0.5 and a clear signature
of entanglement as nominal behavior. Figure 6(b) shows
how the estimate varies as the phase of prepared state is
varied and the detected state is rotated from Ψ+ to Ψ−.
In addition, Figs. 6(c) and (d) show how sub-millimeter
path length delays lead to decreases in the estimated en-
tanglement.
For the system demonstrated here, each entanglement
estimate Eκ is calculated from coincidences collected dur-
ing a 10 second sampling window interval. For this
sampling interval, we observe combined raw coincident
counts of ci ∈ {0, 400} with corresponding standard de-
viation σκ = 0.03 − 0.04. Using these experimentally
measured parameters, the detection theory presented in
Section II yields greater than 0.9999 probability of de-
tecting inauthentic signals with a false alarm chance of
10−9 when using 10 second sampling interval. Longer
sampling windows lead to even lower false alarm rates.
Several factors contribute to reduction in the entan-
glement estimate from a maximal value of 1. Foremost
is the imperfect correction offered by the polarization
controllers, which are subject to drift during acquisition
time. The use of Faraday rotators at the fiber termi-
nals can provide better correction for this type of system
noise. Interfaces between the optical fibers and free-space
3 http://www.xillybus.com
9FIG. 6. a) This contour plots the theoretical value of pa-
rameter E versus phase and path length delay (mm). Red,
black, and green dotted lines indicate the range over which
the experimental data in plots b), c), and d) are taken. b)
Experimental values for E as the phase of the polarization
entangled state is modulated with a liquid crystal waveplate.
At 0 and pi phase the Ψ− and Ψ+ states are obtained, respec-
tively. c) Experimental values for E in the state Ψ− as the
active photon’s path length is increased length. d) Experi-
mental values for E in state Ψ+ as the active photon’s path
length is increased length.
optics also degrade the entanglement, with unwanted
reflections causing photon pairs to become temporally
distinguishable and polarization uncorrected. These re-
sulted in unwanted coincidence events that did not par-
ticipate in HOM interference. Future improvements to
the seal design should make use of more stable Faraday
mirrors to overcome the need to correct the polarization,
and angled optical fiber connectors to eliminate the un-
wanted reflections.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have reported on the design, operation, and im-
plementation of a tamper-indicating quantum seal. Our
approach is based on transmitting polarization-entangled
photon pair states over optical fibers and monitoring the
received entanglement in near real-time. We estimate
the received entanglement from measured coincidences
in a Bell-state analyzer. We show that the entanglement
parameter E is sufficient to discriminate between the en-
tangled states transmitted by the seal and those states
that have been modified by an intruder.
We have also presented a detailed theoretical model ac-
counting for the seal operation including its physics and
an analysis of its performance in terms of binary detec-
tion theory. We have also provided a detailed experimen-
tal implementation of the major subsystems, including an
entangled photon pair source based on cw-pumped SPDC
and a Bell-state analyzer based on two-photon interfero-
metric time-of-arrival measurements. We have integrated
these subsystems with an entanglement monitoring sys-
tem, and we have reported the performance of this seal
implementation in terms of the generated entanglement,
acquisition time, state phase, and temporal delay as they
relate to entanglement detection sensitivity. Based on
these results, we conclude that the seal detects spoofed
states with a probability (PD > 0.9999) at a very low
false alarm rate (PF  10−9) for a 10 second time inter-
val. In conclusion, the tamper-indicating quantum seal
presented here offers unprecedented surety in the detec-
tion of intrusion against fiber optical seal systems. Ap-
plications in containment and surveillance technologies,
as well as telecommunications security and fiber-based
sensors, are likely to benefit from the adaption of these
ideas.
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